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     It has long been the practice to analyze modern Asia from the 
viewpoint of nations and international relationships. Through this bipartite 
framework, much historiographical labor has been expended examining the 
degree of so-called "nation-building" and the acceptance of "international" 
law (萬國公法) in the respective Asian countries.  
     This approach has also been understood to reveal the degree of 
"modernization" of Asian countries. After much controversy concerning the 
adaptability of this Western-oriented modernization model to Asia, however, 
it has also been argued that "areas" or "regions" - an intermediate category 
between the nation and the world generally - should be analyzed in their 
full historical meaning. In fact, the region is an historical reality which 
encompasses a variety of social ties not adequately dealt with under the 
nation-international framework.  
     In studies of economic history, the regional economies which mediate 
national and international economies should indeed be given much more 
weight. At the same time, those carrying out regional studies should avoid 
limiting themselves to local matters which constitute only a part of the 
overall picture.1)  
     Using the regional studies approach, it is necessary to reconstruct the 
whole historical process of modern Asia. That is, the history of modern Asia 
needs to be clarified, not in terms of the "stages of development" of the 
Western modernization model, but in terms of the complex of 
interrelation-ships within the region itself, in the light of Asian 
self-conceptions.  
     Generally speaking, Asian history is the history of a unified system 
characterized by internal tribute/tribute-trade relations, with China at the 
center. This tribute system is the premise of the "modern" Asia which has 
emerged in the Asia region and is reflected in several aspects of 
contemporary Asian history.2)  
     This framework of analysis of modern Asia requires a reinterpretation 
of the following four issues:  
     l Chinese ideals of control and their institutional manifestations;  
     2 The historical role of the tribute system and the relationships   
        within it;  
     3 The relationship between "East" and "West;"  
     4 The modern history of Japan and China.  
     Among the conclusions likely to be drawn from such a reinterpretation, 
several are of particular interest:  
     Firstly, the prevalent understanding has been that China has been a 
centralized despotism with a huge bureaucratic institution. The 
reinterpretation will delineate a center-local relationship involving a 
division of powers, with the center itself as an economic subject alongside 
other local ones.3)  
     As for the tribute system, it has been understood that the recognition 
and investiture of a king in each tribute country ( 册封) was central to the 
maintenance of the Sinocentric system. But, in fact, the system was an 
external expression of basic domestic relations of control which saw a 
hierarchical division of power - from the provinces downward and outward. 
Thus, the tribute system was an organic entity with center-periphery 
relations extending from the central government to the provinces and 
dependencies of the Empire, including the native tribes and administrators 
of native districts, tribute countries and even trading partners. As a part of 
this continuum, areas of southeast, northeast, central and northwest Asia 
functioned as a tribute trade area with east Asia as its center, the whole 
being connected with the adjacent Indian trade area.4)  
     Next, this new systemic understanding of tribute trade relations bears 
major implications for the history of East-West relations.  
     Westerners newly arrived in Asia, particularly the Portuguese and 
Spanish, had to participate in an intra-Asian trade network that already 
existed in order to obtain what they wanted. This also means that there was 
little direct exchange of commodities between East and West. Eastern 
countries could obtain necessities either by payment in silver or through 
exchange within the intra-Asian trade system. Nor did things change much 
when Holland and England entered the picture. They, too, had to come to 
terms with the existing Asian tribute trade system, adapt to it, and learn to 
utilize it. Consequently, the nature of Western "expansion" in and "impact" 
on Asia was conditioned by the existence of this Asian trade zone based on 
the tribute trade system, even after the advent of the "modern" period. 
China and the Asian tribute trade system responded to Western countries 
and the imposed treaties from within the system. Hence it is difficult to 
define modern Asia clearly according to the change from the tribute system 
to the treaty system.5)  
     Finally, on the basis of the foregoing, it might again be asked what 
"modern" Asia is and how it may be interpreted within the framework of the 
tribute system and tribute trade area.  
     In examining post-19th-century Asian economic history, the 
capitalism-industrialization framework has generally been used, with the 
degree of "modernization" being determined according to the degree of 
industrialization. Moreover, the modernization process is examined in terms 
of two sets of stimuli: - internal and external. Judged from the viewpoint of 
the tribute system, however, Asian modernization cannot be grasped by 
merely presenting stages in the formation of national economies in each 
country, but must be defined on the basis of the relationships between Asian 
countries and the tribute trade system, and the transformation of those 
relationships. The Asian modernization process will then be examined, not 
in terms of the degree of impact of the West, but of the degree of change in 
the relationship between each country and area of Asia towards the regional 
tribute trade system. In such a perspective, the new relations with the West 
only offered a certain motivation for changes in the system, and did not 
replace it. The case of Japan, however, is exceptional. Japan did consciously 
undertake to industrialize and Westernize itself, so the process may usefully 
be viewed as one of "modernization." But if we look into the historical 
motivation for Japanese industrialization, we will find that Japan, too, 
chose its particular course in order to cope with the tribute trade system. 
Thus, it may still be said that even Japan was strongly affected by this 
system that bound the various countries of the region into a single entity or 
zone.  
 
2. Sino-Japanese Relations in the Modern Asian World  
     If we view the tribute trade zone, composed of an East Asian economic 
zone and a Southeast Asia-South China economic zone, as an historical 
system functioning with its own integrating rationale, what implications 
does this have for our understanding of the relationship between East and 
West ? And how should we view the long history of the Sino-Japanese 
relationship within this zone ? Finally, how might we reinterpret the 
"modernization" of Asia ?  
     As was mentioned at the outset, generally speaking, the Western 
countries did not constitute their own category outside the tribute system. 
They were all included under the logic of tribute relations, and even 
geographically speaking were seen as being situated at some indeterminate 
distance beyond the frontiers of China. In Kuang-tung, for example, Great 
Britain was not even identified by Chinese officials as the same country that 
had sent a diplomatic representation to Tibet.6)  Accordingly, when 
Western countries first dealt with Asia, they had little choice but to deal 
with the tribute relations which were the basis of all relations in the region. 
They could enter Asia only by participating in the tribute trade network and 
managed to modify it only after they had established a working base within 
it. From the viewpoint of Asian history, Asian countries never responded 
individually or separately to Western countries coming to Asia, but rather 
through the tribute trade system to which all of them belonged as integral 
parts.  
     The history of relations between China and Siam provides an 
interesting example of how Asian countries viewed Western countries and 
utilized them for Asian purposes. In 1884, during the Sino-French war over 
Indo-China, the Governor-General of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, P'eng 
Yu-lin (兩廣總督彭玉麟), sent the self-strengthening movement entrepreneur 
Cheng Kuan-yin （鄭觀應）on a mission to Siam. His personal records 
contain the following section, which at first glance seems to contradict the 
image of an enlightened intellectual of the time.  
     "On the 26th of May, 1884, when Cheng Kuan-yin met the ;'consul" of 
Siam in Singapore, Ch'en Chin-chung (駐星加坡暹羅領事陳金鐘), he said 
that (a) it was a "crime" for Siam to have stopped its tribute embassies to 
China and (b) that such a decision by Siam was not justified even, under 
inter-national law ( 公 法 )."7)  Although Cheng was supposedly an 
enlightened, Western educated Chinese referring to international law and 
borrowing it as a standard of judgment, he did not in fact apply the Western 
concept of international relations to Siam, but argued for maintaining the 
historical ' tribute relationship, a superior-subordinate relationship. In 
other words, he utilized international law only, as a means of argument, 
not ,as a basis for equal relations. On the other hand, Ch'en Chin-chung 
counterattacked by saying that if China wanted to arrange a treaty with 
Siam, it should welcome Ch'en in Kuang-tung or T'ien-chin (天津) ,for 
'negotiations' (交渉 ).8)  Ch'en thus utilized the concepts of Western 
'international law' and treaty negotiations between equals to back his 
argument. Both of them, however, clearly saw the relationship between th~ 
two countries as a tribute relationship, making only partial use of Western 
ideas.  
     In general, we may say that the entrance of Western countries into the 
Asian tribute trade zone started with their participation in intra-Asian 
trade. Portugal and Holland, for example, conducted an intermediate trade 
within the Asian area to earn funds to purchase necessities in Europe. 
Great Britain's penetration of Asia began in the 17th century on the 
strength of its superiority in shipping. British ships carried Asian products 
like rice to China, products which had previously been imported by China 
through, the tribute trade relations, and they bought Chinese products like 
tea and silk with proceeds from the sale of these other Asian products. In 
the 19th century, Western countries started to directly cultivate raw 
materials like rubber in Asia to meet their own industrial needs, and to sell 
their industrial products to Asia. For this purpose they had to link the 
intra-Asian trade with the international market by establishing spots where 
the settlement of trade balances might be conducted. Such places played an 
intermediary role between two quite distinct markets. Thus, Hong Kong and 
Singapore took on the role of junctures between the two markets and 
absorbed l huge amounts of funds from overseas Chinese.9)  In 
consequence, the Southeast Asian and southern Chinese economies were 
linked much more closely, and their ties extended to the Indian Ocean trade 
zone. Despite this geographic extension of the trading zone, however, the 
marketing structure in European colonies in Asia continued to display the 
characteristics of the traditional intra-Asian trade associated with the 
tribute system. Elements of domestic, intermediate and international 
markets were all to be found in Singapore and Hong Kong.10)  
     With this brief description of the relationship between the Asian 
tribute trade system and the West behind us, we may now turn to the 
problem of the modern relations between Japan and China. How did they 
start ? Former studies on the subject have concentrated on comparative 
analyses of the differences in speed or direction of "modernization" under 
"Western impact."11) Studies of the relationship between the two countries 
focused on the Japanese adoption of a national strengthening policy and 
Japan's expansion into China from the time of the Sino-Japanese war in 
1894.  In general, such studies traced the history of modern Japan only 
from the viewpoint of "Westernization" - the emergence of a "small West" (小
西洋) in Asia. In my view, however, Japanese modernization should be 
traced mainly from the perspective of its generation from within the tribute 
system centered on China. To put it in its starkest form, Japanese 
modernization was the process of relocating the center of the tribute trade 
structure in Japan. Put another way, the main issue in Japanese 
modernization was how to cope with the Chinese dominance over 
commercial relations in Asia, a dominance which had functioned as a 
Sino-centric economic integration through the tribute trade system. A, s for 
the international political relations of modern .Japan, the important 
question was how to reorganize relations among Japan, China, Korea and 
Liu-ch'iu or Ryukyu, with Japan relocated at the center.  
     First, let us consider these questions from the economic angle. Former 
studies have described .Japanese modernization in terms of recovery of 
autonomy in tariff matters and of industrialization, that is, as matters of 
national sovereignty and the formation of a national economy. Analysis of 
these issues started from an interest in clarifying the process of realization 
of "national wealth and power" (富國強兵). But if we ask why Japan chose to 
industrialize in the first place, past studies do not prove very convincing. In 
other words, although there are many discussions of the processes 
of .Japanese industrialization, investigations of the motivation for Japanese 
industrialization are rare. Because the course of Japanese modernization 
was studied from the standpoint of recovery from subordination to Western 
countries, or independence from the West, the importance of the historical 
relationship between .Japan and China in the tribute system was lost sight 
of. But to understand the direction and nature of Japanese modernization 
more deeply, it is most important to recognize that the motivation for 
Japan's industrialization after the opening of .Japan's ports was generated 
from within a web of commercial relations with China.  
     The main reason why Japan chose the direction of industrialization 
was its defeat in attempts to expand commercial relations with China. 
Japanese merchants faced the well-established power of overseas Chinese 
merchants built through the Dejima trade (出島貿易) in Nagasaki (長崎) 
during the Edo (江戸) period. Chinese merchants monopolized the export 
business for sea-foods and native commodities and Japanese merchants 
simply could not break their hold.  
     When the Japanese consul in Hong Kong, Suzuki (鈴木領事 ) 
emphasized the importance of the Hong Kong market in 1890 in a report he 
sent to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs commenting on the low 
spirits of Japanese merchants in Hong Kong, among other things, he 
pointed to the following:  
     l) The Chinese merchants were united and had a long-term 
         strategy  
          which went beyond short-term profit;  
     2) Japanese merchants lacked funds and when they suffered even a 
     single loss, had to withdraw;  
     3) There were indications that Japanese products of which Chinese  
          people were fond were sold to Chinese merchants much cheaper 
          than to Japanese merchants by Japanese producers.12)  
 
     According to the consul's report, the influence of Chinese merchants 
not only held the local market in its grip but even extended to Japanese 
producers, and he was very pessimistic about Japanese merchants entering 
the Hong Kong market. It was under such circumstances-the commercial 
power of the Chinese merchants and their influence in Japan-that new 
possibilities for cultivating the Chinese market presented themselves. And 
it was Chinese merchants in Japan who introduced the information 
necessary to produce the cotton textiles which could substitute for the 
Western cotton textiles which already had secured a significant share in the 
Chinese market.  
     In the 19th year of Meiji (明治  ; 1887), Chinese merchants in 
Yokohama (横濱) started to buy cotton cloth produced in Saitama (埼玉) 
prefecture. The parties concerned pushed the authorities to promote exports 
to the Chinese market and asked the Japanese consul in Hong Kong about 
future possibilities. The advice given by prominent Chinese merchants in 
Hong Kong was:  l) wide cloth, the same as Western textiles, was required,  
2) plain, striped cloth should be supplied, and  3) the price should be 
appropriate. Based on this advice, production and export to China got 
underway.13)  This example is symbolic of the general course of Japanese 
industrialization, which started with the production of substitutes for 
Western textiles in Asia. Com-petition among Japan, China and India in the 
production of cotton textiles also started at about this time.  
     Thirdly, increased foreign trade with Western countries through 
foreign firms also provided a motivation for industrialization. The 
development of new exports like silk and coal, alongside such traditional 
items as seafoods, accelerated the building of industrial infrastructure.14)  
Although this tendency was the result of the commercial activities of 
Western firms, the main aim of such firms was not to export the industrial 
products of their own countries but to import Asian products. Hence trade 
relations in east Asia were not significantly changed by the opening of the 
Japanese market.  
     Political relations between Japan and China in the early Meiji period 
can now also be reinterpreted. Most previous studies of the Sino-Japanese 
treaty signed on the 13th May, 1871 (日清修好條規〔中日辛未條約〕) conclude 
that the treaty gave expression to the equality of the two nations, as 
demonstrated by the approval of mutual consular jurisdictions. In general, 
it is pointed out that the treaty embodied the idea of the equality of nations 
common to modern international intercourse, and that it marked the 
opening of the modern era in international relations in East Asia.15)  It is 
doubtful, however, whether the equality supposedly secured by the 
Japanese side was recognized as such by its Chinese counterpart. 
Underlying Chinese recognition of other states was the long-established 
idea of a hierarchy of dignity with the Emperor at the top-just as in the 
domestic sphere. It was virtually impossible for the Chinese to conceive of 
"equality" with the Emperor. The Kiakhta Treaty of 1727 with Russia can 
serve as an example of the problem.  
     The Kiakhta Treaty also embodies a stipulation of "equality" in its 
sixth article, dealing with exchange of official letters. The article provides 
that such letters should be exchanged between the Russian Senate (元老院) 
and the Ch'ing Colonial Office (理藩院).16)  Compared to the one-sided 
nature of the tribute system in which China was clearly dominant, the 
exchange of letters under the Kiakhta arrangement appears evenhanded. 
But China did not really see Russia in equal terms because the mandate of 
the Colonial Office was to control the affairs of the Mongols. Th~ treaty also 
provided for the opening of mutual trade (互市) on the frontier in place of 
trade in the Assembly Hall in Peking.  Although this regulation also may 
seem to imply equality between the two countries, the trade in question was 
originally conducted as a part of the tribute trade relationship. We can also 
find a good deal of evidence to show that knowledgeable Chinese believed 
the Emperor was merely doing Russia a favor.  
     Taking these economic and political factors as among the motivations 
for Japanese modernization - factors which were implicit in the tribute 
system and not a part of the so called "Western impact" - allows us to see 
that the modernization process was initiated within a fairly unstable 
international environment. After Japan emerged from the closed-door 
isolation policy of the Edo period it adopted the two-fold policy of 
repudiating the tribute system of which it had previously been a part and of 
re-entering into East Asian relations on a new basis. Japan had to confront 
the tribute system when it tried to reconstruct its relationship with Korea 
and the Ryukyus. Historically speaking, it ultimately proved fatal for Japan 
to confront in all its aspects a system which was still largely functioning in 
East Asia.  
 
3. Five Generations of Okinawa Studies in a hundred and fifty years :  
Literature Review 
 
Okinawa studies since the time of the Meiji(1868-1912) spans 5 
generations over 150 years including five different perspectives covering 
more than 500 years of Okinawa history.     
First generation Okinawa Studies is represented by Iha Fuyu who 
studied Okinawa under  kokugaku (Japan Studies).  Under the 
perspective from  kokugaku, Okinawa, had on the one hand, become a part 
of the new Meiji Japan, while at the same time, continued to display unique 
characteristics which defy categorization under Japanese kokugaku. Thus, 
issues on how to include Okinawa under kokugaku remain unresolved.  
Yanagi Soetsu and Yanagida Kunio attempted to study Okinawa from 
socio-anthropological perspectives but remained largely within the 
framework of kokugaku.  Issues which could not be categorized under 
kokugaku were picked up under anthropology.   
Iha Fuyu was the first generation Okinawa Studies scholar who 
attempted to place Okinawa in history noting two opposing extremities: 
Okinawa which became a constituent part of Japan’s nation building while 
at the same time, continued to display its own deep-rooted historical 
characteristics.  Iha Fuyu entered the College of Literature, Tokyo 
Imperial University in 1903. He examined Okinawa under Asian Studies 
which developed from Sinology to Oriental history.  He was the first to 
examine Okinawa from the methods of Japanese History which was then 
being developed to be Japan’s national history.  Iha Fuyu placed the 
identity of Okinawans not under a specific nationality(kokka) nor ethnic 
group(minzoku) but rather, called them “people of the sea.”  In “Okinawans 
of the Sea” (Umi no Okinawa-jin) (Iha Fuyu collection, tenth volume, p. 16), 
he writes: 
“Pushed by the necessity of this period/environment, I am now going to 
establish Okinawa Steamship company. It is very useful to remember the 
maritime kingdom which was established four to five hundred years ago.” 
Here, he recalls Okinawa’s struggle in the maritime world even as it 
had become a part of the Japanese nation.  
Second generation Okinawa Studies refers to publications and 
research (by Okinawan scholars) related to the conversion, after the Meiji 
Restoration in 1879, from Ryukyu Kingdom to Okinawa Prefecture.  The 
main topics covered by this stream of research include: Okinawa falls under 
the Meiji Government; Ryukyu, which had belonged to the East Asian 
tributary system is now under the Japanese nation; a new Okinawa 
prefecture was established, a governor was sent from Tokyo; thus began the 
assimilation (hondoka) of Okinawa into Japan. 
Meiji policy towards Okinawa was to severe the legitimacy of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom which was loyal to the Qing government by sending a 
mission to China once every two years.  With regard to its relationship 
with Japan, since the Satsuma invasion in 1609, Okinawa served as a 
quasi-tributary state of Japan. In her relationship with Japan, instead of 
legitimizing the Ryukyu Kingdom, Okinawa was made to serve as a conduit 
for trade between China and Japan.  Therefore, to allow Japan to envelop 
Okinawa, making it a Japanese prefecture was, for some within the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, unnecessary, if not illegal. As a result, there was a movement to 
return to the Qing government (dassei undo).  A feature of second 
generation Okinawa Studies is thus, their criticisms of the Meiji 
government’s policies towards the Ryukyu Kingdom.    
First generation Okinawa Studies represented by Iha Fuyu and second 
generation studies, on Meiji Japan, particularly, those on Okinawa shobun 
(“disposition/disposal of Okinawa”) reflect historical knowledge of their 
times, while at the same time, also differences between them.  Iha Fuyu 
lived from the 19th century through 20th century, reflecting on Ryukyu 
surrounded by the seas five hundred years ago, while both Kinjo Seitoku 
and Nishizato Kiko (both native Okinawans) lived in the same 20th century, 
reflected on the Meiji restoration a hundred and fifty years ago.  These 
scholars compared the Okinawa and Japan relations of their time.  In the 
case of Kinjo and Nishizato, they also studied issues relating to Okinawa’s 
Nihon fukki (reversion to the mainland Japan) in the 1970s. 
Third generation Okinawa Studies focused on the American 
occupation after the second world-war.  Work by Gabe Masaaki on 
Okinawa after the war touched on issues concerning the legitimacy of the 
US occupation bases; problems within Okinawa due to the presence of those 
bases; American influence on Okinawa, or Okinawa’s role to America in the 
context of the Vietnam and Gulf wars.  This third generation Okinawa 
Studies also compares the Ryukyu Kingdom’s foreign relations during 
Perry’s expedition a hundred and fifty years ago.  
Okinawa history was studied in the first three generations at spans of 
fifty, a hundred and fifty, and five hundred years.  Fourth generation 
Okinawa Studies revisits history from the time of the Ryukyu Kingdom.  
Rather than focusing on changes in sovereignties by foreign powers, from 
American to Japanese, this fourth generation studies took pride in the 
Ryukyu Kingdom’s place in the sea, emphasizing the spread of the 
Ryukyu/Okinawa identity to Southeast Asia . 
This fourth generation Okinawa Studies raised issues not on relations 
with Japan, but on relations with China and focused on Asia.  Takara 
Kurayoshi takes note of the fact that Okinawa, as a Chinese tributary state 
for 500 years, built relations not just with China, but also multiple 
networks with East and Southeast Asia. The Ryukyu Kingdom and 
Ryukyuan traders conducted long distance trade under these networks.    
From there it was pointed out that, Okinawa was a regional world, a 
network world by itself.  Okinawa was China’s tributary state, sending 
from Shuri, seat of Ryukyu Kingdom, envoys to China, while at the same 
time, it was also regional power who received tribute goods from Miyako 
and Yaeyama.  This perspective from the Ryukyu Kingdom, as represented 
by work by Tomiyama Kazuyuki is not limited to the history of Okinawa.  
It emphasizes Okinawa’s networks, maritime connections and foreign 
relations with the outside world while at the same time, systematically 
sheds light on the internal workings of Okinawa.  
Fourth generation scholars are motivated to unveil an independent 
maritime model of Okinawa on its own due to an inability to divide 
Okinawa/Ryukyu history solely according to changes in sovereignty e.g. 
from Qing government to Japan, or from the US back to Japan again. Thus, 
Okinawa Studies that studies the Ryukyu Kingdom will methodically 
contribute new topics to East Asian maritime history and also form the 
subject of study. 
Fifth generation Okinawa studies is the current generation. It differs 
from the first, second or third generation Okinawa studies which tried to 
have Okinawa fit under standards determined under a certain “nation” or 
“ethnic group”.  It also differs from fourth generation studies which regard 
Ryukyu Kingdom as a regional world by itself.  The fifth generation 
describes the emigrating, networking Okinawans: the emigrants, Okinawan 
identity, emigration networks, world of uchinanchuu (Okinawans vs. 
“yamatonchu” Japanese).   This fifth generation, responding to the effects 
of globalization, criticizes Okinawan modernization from a post-modern 
perspective and attempts to create a new Okinawan model while 
acknowledging Okinawa’s scattered nature. Tomiyama Ichiro does not 
attempt to look for unity within Okinawa, rather, he focused on Okinawan 
societies in mainland Japan.  This fifth generation re-examines the 
development and perspectives of hitherto Okinawa/Ryukyu studies while 
also focusing discussions on global uchinanchuu networks.    
As such, Okinawa Studies spanning five generations, in five different 
themes or directions, provided a variety themes not limited to Okinawa 
Studies per se including historical studies, regional studies and network 
studies. 
 
4. Perry’s opening of Ryukyu  
 
Most notably, Naha’s importance as an international port was 
immediately supplanted by Nagasaki. Gradually, Kobe and Yokohama were 
made the main ports to deal with the outside world.  While the physical 
shift in the windows that maintain direct contact with the outside world is 
obvious, it in effect entails the demise of Ryukyu’s traditional maritime 
expansion/extension into the international world; such a role being 
overtaken by Japan.  In other words, it was necessary to nationalize 
maritime expansion/influence.  The “opening” of Japan effectively meant 
the “closing” of Okinawa.  This marks the beginning of nanyou mondai 
(South seas problem/issue).   Nanyou mondai began with the 
nationalization of Ryukyu, followed by the occupation of Taiwan and 
continued further down to South–east Asia.  Debates revolving nanyou 
mondai  used to be limited to Southeast Asia. Neither Ryukyu nor Taiwan 
were included.  This was due to the fact that the maritime roles/functions 
of Ryukyu and Taiwan have been absorbed under the Japanese “nation.” 
Another consequence of the “nationalization” of Ryukyu was the 
displacement of Ryukyu’s position in the Sinocentric world order. The 
Americans sent Perry, while the French sent Rev. Focault to approach 
Japan via Okinawa, making use of the kai-i order (Chinese world order 
(huayi).  However, Japan did not succumb to this.  Instead, it took over 
Okinawa’s position in the tributary system, subjugated it under the 
Japanese “nation”; thus enabling Japan’s nationalization against the 
outside world.  
We can say that Okinawa made Japan’s nation building possible by 
replacing traditional logic in East Asian history. In other words, the 
southwest stronghold (seinan yuhan)(Satsuma domain) with its experience 
in East Asian ka-i order rose to lead the country. It nationalized the East 
Asian trade order which it had traditionally made use of. 
When that happened, Okinawa fell out of the radar of East Asian 
history.  Today, by reviving the Asian perspective of Okinawa we can 
re-think the relationship between Japan and East Asia, Japan and 
Southeast Asia or the relationship between East and Southeast Asia.  In 
contrast to this, scholars in Japan were either “sympathetic” towards 
Okinawa or criticized modern Japan.  Or, in the process of discovering 
Okinawan society, they were limited by looking at Okinawa through the 
framework of “nation.”  
When viewed from “nation” framework, most discussions focused on 
the gap between Okinawa and Japan; whether Okinawa is homogeneous 
like Japan, whether its citizens enjoy the same rights and obligations as the 
Japanese?  Thus, most discussions tended to focus on differences with 
Japan.  Ryukyu’s traditional elements  which do not fit into Japan are 
treated as issues of folklore or customs beyond the Japanese context. 
Rather than to view Okinawa as detached from Japan, if we take a 
view from Okinawa’s historical world which includes Japan,  we would be 
able to observe Ryukyu’s.multi-layered administrative structure when it 
belonged to the Chinese-centred ka-i order, its negotiation skills with China 
and Japan, its co-existence with Li dynasty Korea, and its negotiation 
processes with America.  These were accumulated experiences amidst its 
own specific pre-conditions and environment which cannot be enclosed 
within a single prefecture. 
In this way, attempts by native Japanese scholars who continue to ask 
“Does Okinawa fit into Japan?” while at the same time trying to Japanize 
Okinawa (hondoka; to make it more like the mainland) continue to be 
overturned by Okinawa’s strong regionalism.  In the context of today’s 
globalization, that regionalism is not so much  region vs. central, but 
rather, a region on the global stage.  This makes it necessary to re-consider 
Okinawa’s multi-layered, multi-faceted regional order or co-existence 
(negotiation) relations. 
As seen in Ryukyuu/Okinawa history, there are as many regional 
models corresponding to many varied regions, and there are also many 
methodologies.  It is probably not an exaggeration to say that there are as 
many methodologies as there are regions and, there are as many regional 
models as there are methodologies.   Therefore, it is quite impossible to 
discover one particular direction/trend for topics and methods of regional 
studies.  Regions cross-fertilize, trading each other’s positions, mutually 
permeating each other, thus making it extremely difficult to discuss regions. 
However, if seen from a different perspective, this multiplicity reflects 
Okinawa’s multiplicity.  Thus to study Okinawa, we need multiple 
approaches. 
As a result of fluctuations in our changing world, the study of history 
in the past ten or more years is undergoing some major changes.  Firstly, 
what may be referred to as “grand theories,” or theoretical frameworks 
which described historical societies have disappeared/vanished.  Along with 
nation-building and the development of capitalism, what used to attract 
popular interest has changed: It is no longer appropriate to use one single 
model to apply to the vast array of societies.  Given such a scenario, on the 
one hand is the demise of “grand theories” and gradually replacing these are 
ecology and demographic studies which emphasize the importance of 
environmental factors.  It is thus perhaps a natural consequence for 
regional/area studies to be added. Why is this so?  By increasing the focus 
on the environment (a constant) while reducing the role of theory (variable) 
probably allows easier access to our object of study.….. However, although it 
is necessary to take into consideration these new variables in the “grand 
designs” of long term changes in history, these variables alone will not be 
sufficient to replace traditional theory. 
A second notable trend in historical studies in recent years is the 
increased interest in social history.  Historical studies which take into 
consideration topics of the complex modern society are attracting more 
attention.  In that respect the number of individual studies that greatly 
contribute to our understanding has accumulated.  However, if the basic 
assumption in social history is the multiplicity/complexity of society, it 
seems necessary to re-examine the disparity of research..   
A third feature of modern historical studies concerns research which 
deal with psychology of time (jidai shinri), or affiliation (kizoku ishiki). In 
other words, the rise in identity studies.  Due to the variety of histories, the 
“eyes” (me) which study history are also varied.  These identity studies face 
the challenge of having to distinguish between “analysis” and 
“self-awareness” emphasizing the importance of the need to listen to the 
many voices of historical protagonists.  Receiving input from such research, 
debates/discussions on the diversity of regional identities of various regional 
models will form a major part of modern historical research. 
      
Conclusion: Warning messages from Okinawa: against “Economic 
development” and “Consumer society”  
 
     "Modernization" in Asia was generated as a negative reaction to the 
all-inclusive superior-subordinate relations of the traditional tribute system. 
Mercantilist control over tribute by the Ch'ing dynasty led overseas Chinese 
merchants to oppose the trade policy and expand their own private trade. As 
a result, the Ch'ing dynasty was in turn compelled to shift from the role of 
monopolistic trader-merchant to that of tax collector. European countries 
expanded their influence in Asia by first utilizing the tribute trade system 
and heavily investing in it. Japan, using Westernization as a means of 
modernization, tried to reconstruct the Asian system, but found itself 
trapped between a strong Sinocentrism and an equally strong West. Our 
approach has been to try to grasp Asia as an integrated historical system. 
What is required now to understand 'modern Asia is an effort to trace how 
each country and area within Asia attempted to cope with the 
transformation of the tribute system. Modern Asia can.no longer be 
fruitfully measured by such yardsticks as the degree of Western "impact" 
and Asian "response," but must be examined by delineating the region's 
fundamental traditional characteristics, and then analyzing how the 
traditional system turned even the Western "impact" to its own purposes.   
Today, mankind is faced with problems which had not historically 
been encountered before.  Along with rapid advances in technology and 
economies, material comforts have increased on the one hand, while, on the 
other, due to the uneven distribution of populations and goods, some regions 
suffer from severe poverty.   
It used to be that the higher the level of industrialization the better it 
was. However, we are now confronted with pressing issues like the 
environment and resources.  We are being forced to re-examine the 
unconditional pursuit for higher productivity and consumption.  Perhaps a 
common goal achievable for all mankind does not exist.  What was widely 
perceived as the common goal for all: higher productivity and consumption, 
in reality required some special pre-conditions. Wasn’t it just the 
self-assertion of certain specific, small regions?  It has come to be 
recognized that this was the egocentrism of modern Europe. Consequently, 
it became realized that our understanding of the world or of world history 
had in fact, been borrowed from European or American regionalisms. 
Historical studies currently confronted with major changes: faced with 
problems of modern society. The assumption that the world as a whole 
develops through the building of individual nations and by mutual 
competition among them is now being criticized. 
National identity, a hallmark of nation-building delineating self 
against others may not apply universally in the fast-changing world.  
Therefore, the new focus for historical research will come from an overall 
re-examination of the governance of human society and lessons learnt from 
modern national histories whose ultimate targets were to “develop” and to 
“move forward.”    
In recent years, the many efforts to re-organize regional relationships 
offers much food for thought (for historical research). While there are many 
instances of detaching from existing framework of “nation,” at the same 
time, it is also popular to group several nations or regions into regional 
blocs.  Examples include the European Union, Pan-Pacific community or 
South China economic zone (Da hua-nan).  Such a situation calls to 
question the limited use of the “nation state” which was characteristic of 
19th to 20th century Europe. Considering the fact that Ryukyu/Okinawa had 
accumulated experience in regional or distant maritime activities or long 
distance trade networks, it is an important object of study for modern and 
future history. 
Of course in this process, non-European regions also had their own 
egocentrism. Despite assertions of racialism or regionalism, European 
self-knowledge ultimately remains confined within the “nation-state.”   
In response to such changes, historical studies need to focus on 
“region” and re-examine history in various ways.  We need also to consider 
the fact that some regional problems are presented and taken as problems of 
the “nation.” Thus, through (1) various studies of the Okinawa regional 
world, (2) re-examination of the bigger regions like Europe, East Asia, South 
Asia, West Asia and America and (3) by logically and theoretically 
examining what constitutes a “region” would we be guided to new regional 
relations and how to maintain regional stability.   
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